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Kernos
PLATO'S MANTIC MYTHS IN THE SERVICE OF SOCRATES'
MAIEUTIC ART*
As those familiar with Plato's dialogues know, Socrates assumes, in
theory, his mother's art of midwifery, which, in practice, he translates
into a dialogical procedure, that special form of dialectic he dubs «the
maieutic art» Ch llexteu'ttKl]... tÉXVTJ)l. By means of this art, he would, with
god's help2, deliver his patients from false opinion and so prepare them
for an authentic parturition. As he puts it
What is most important in my art is this, that it is able to put to the
test, in every way, whether the young person's thought brings to birth
a false phantom or a true offspring3.
Now, in connection with this art, Plato has added on occasions, at the
end of a particular argument-line, an appropriate myth (handed down
supposedly from an ancient source), which offers, at the least, relief
from the strain of the dialectic4. These myths, however, are more than
dramatic intervals5; for, as Plato also makes clear, they serve by
*
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4
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l am indebted to my coIleague Professor Kathleen Johnson Wu, who has read
and made corrective comments on this paper, and express my thanks for her
criticism and encouragement.
Theaetetus, 210b8. (AlI readings and citations are from the Greek text of John
Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, 5 vols [New York: Oxford University Press, 1903-
1910]; aIl translations are mine). Vide Richard ROBINSON, Plato's Earlier
Dialectic (Second ed.), Oxford, 1953, p. 83-84.
Cf. Crito, 54e;Apology, 42a, 19a, 23a, and 35d, where god (8eoç) is referred to as
'guide'. The better account of this function occurs at Crito, 48c6-7, where
'reason' or 'argument' (which, of course, is considered divine/godlike) takes the
place of'god'. Vide E,R. DODDS, Plato: 'Gorgias', Oxford, 1959, p. 386, at 527e1-
2 : «The Socratic precept Ë1tEcr8a.t 'tep 'A.6yrp naturaIly led to the personification of
the Myoç as a 'guide'».
Theaetetus, 150b9-c3; cf. 210b4-dl.
Cf. Statesman, 268d8-9.
Vide R.F. MOORS, Platonic Myth : An Introductory Study, Washington, D.C.,
1982, p. 97 and 113. On p. 97, he writes : «... myth [is] not merely a trapping or
an addendum to discussion. Myth shares the essential objectives of philosophie
discussion and projects those objectives in figurative symbolic terms». Cf. P.
FRUTIGER, Les Mythes de Platon, New York, 1976, p. 267; also P. FRIEDLANDER,
Plato : An Introduction, Hans Meyerhoff, trans., Princeton, 1969, l, p. 209-210;
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projection as conveyances of immediate truth6• What this cornes to, 1
c1aim, is that these myths are covertly in the service of the maieutic art,
playing the special role of furnishing fodder for the extrapolation of fact
from fiction. This conjectural process is a unique mytho-logical
inference of Plato's invention, which 1 have here christened the
«mantic» function of myth.
Taken generaHy, 't€XVll IllXV'ttKYt is the art or faculty of divination, the
occult technique of foreseeing future events or divining sorne unknown
lore, beyond the bounds of reason, by invoking supernatural powers7.
Plato's myths, in this sense, fulfiH this basic function, providing fictive
accounts of eschatological beliefs. But they also become a curious means
of divining from these beliefs philosophical truths of moral import,
albeit within the bounds of reason, by adducing plausible probabilities
that, while not so convincing as proofs, are beyond reasonable doubt and
admittedly persuasive8. These probabilities, taking on the role of
«truths» and «first principles»9, form the background theory to the
theory in question and thus furnish the necessary condition that
determines the logical limits of the «proofs» formulated in the
epagogic10 procedure of the Socratic method.
Focusing, then, on the significance of Plato's mytho-logical strategy
and keying on the Timaeus as an explanatory model, 1 shaH, in my
argument, decode the mantic myth in three ways, with special reference
to its occurrence in the Gorgias as a paradigm case11 : (1) by showing
7
6
9
8
and Janet E. SMITH, Plato's Myths as 'Likely Aecounts', Worthy of Belief, in
Apeiron, 19 (1985), p. 25-26.
FRIEDLANDER, op. cit., I, p. 209, remarks Plato's myths as truth-bearing fictions.
Cf. R. ZASLAVSKY, Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing, Washington, D.C., 1981,
p. 34,43-48; MOORS, op. cit., p. 101-103; SMITH, op. cit., p. 32-34. Vide W.K.C.
GUTHRIE, A History ofGreek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1975, IV, p. 305-307.
Cf. Symposium, 188e6-3c; Phaedrus, 244e1-d5; Philebus, 67b3-7. Note, also, at
Timaeus, 71e-72e, where the liver as the organ of divination lays hold in sorne
degree on truth.
Vide Gorgias, 526d3-4; Phaedo, 108d9-109a8. Cf. SMITH, op. cit., p. 32-33 on
persuasion and myth; K. DORTER, Plato's 'Phaedo' : An Interpretation, Toronto,
1982, p. 8-9, esp. 83-97, 159, and 161; Ronna BURGER, The 'Phaedo' : A Platonic
Labyrinth, New Haven, 1984,passim.
Cf. Republic, 510b4-9, on the ｣ ｘ Ｎ ｐ ｘ ｾ ｶ cX.VU1t08E'tOV of «the upward path»,
eoncerning which ROBINSON, op. cit., p. 156-179, has an excellent account.
10 Epagoge is used here simply as 'induction', in a wider sense than that found in
ROBINSON's account, op. cit., p. 33-48.
11 Other occurrences are found in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Republic, and,
with a different angle, in thePhaedrus and the Statesman.
how myth in its pragmatic role, as distinguished from its dramatic
motive, unveils its mantic function; (2) by adducing from the fictive
details of the myth plausible probabilities as adumbrations of true belief
and remarking the psychological basis of their sanction; and, finally,
(3) by deriving «first principles» from the probabilities and showing
how they together form the background theory that defines the logical
limits of the argument in situ.
Cracking the Fabric ofMyth
The dramatic motive. As holistic art forms, Plato's myths play their
part in the dialogues in dramatic instances which afford the
interlocutors, as weIl as the reader, a refreshing filler from lengthy
discourse, a fascinating tale of occult power (maybe, with tongue-in-
cheek), or simply a playful diversion; and Plato usually has Socrates or
sorne dramatis persona remark that particular motive. For example, in
the Phaedo, foUowing the final argument on the immortality of the soul
and after relating his lengthy myth on the earth and afterlife, Socrates
refers to it as a «magic charm» (rocrm,p E1tÇ:OEtV) that should inspire aU
with confidence and good cheer12. Similarly, in the Laws, the Athenian
Stranger, although admitting the force of compelling arguments, stiU
recognizes the need of myths to charm the soul (E1tCfloroV ... JluSrov Ë'tt
'ttvrov)13. Again in the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger, after stumbling
in the dialectic and failing to define precisely the royal or kingly art,
suggests taking a new starting-point by a different route, but first offers
a «worthy tale» (JlEYuÀou JluSou) to mitigate the strain of protracted
argument14. In other places, Socrates also refers to myth in its dramatic
force as poe tic embellishment, suggesting the role of play and
amusement and dubbing the myths with such descriptive labels as
«pleasant stories» (1tpàç 'tà lloÉroç JlUSoÀoyi'1crat)15, «prudent tales» (JluSOtcrt
craô<ppocrtV )16, «fairest tales» (KuÀÀtcr'ta JlEJlUSoÀo'Y1lJléva) 17 , and
«auspicious accounts» (KaÀoû ÀÔyou) 18. So much, then, for the internaI
12 Phaedo, 114d; vide BURGER, op. cit., p. 9, 85, 189, and 193.
13 Laws, 903b.
14 Statesman, 268d.
15 Greater Hippias, 286a; cf. Protagoras, 320c.
16 Meno, 96a (quotation from Theognis).
17 Republic, 378e.
18 Gorgias, 523a.
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evidence showing that these fictions serve as poetic interludes to fit the
dramatic intent and structure of the dialogue 19.
A pragmatic rale. Further evidence shows, however, that some myths
also have a pragmatic role, one in keeping with the intent and structure
of the dialectic. They are not just pleasant stories but are also useful
(XP1lcrqlOV) mantic devices bearing philosophieal import20. In his telling
brief on a mythic passage in the Statesman, Paul Shorey insinuates this
practical agency with his forthright statement that «deep truths are
hidden in many ancient fables»21. This underlying alethic motif
becomes the pragmatic angle of the mantic myth, that special value
feature in which the utility of the myth consists. In the Republic, for
example, there among the serviceable functions of false accounts ('to èv
'toîç À6YOtç \jIEûùoç)22 Socrates alleges that storytelling (lluSoÀoytu) is a
useful means of mythotropic conversion of fiction into fact (àÀ'llS1Îç-
'what is true')23 :
Because of our ignorance of truth about the ancient past, we [now]
portray, as best we can, the fictitious as fact (true) and so make it
useful (à<p0llowûv'tEç àÀllSeî 'to \jIEÛÙOÇ o'tt Il<xÀto"'tu 01h00 XP1Î(HIlOV
TCoWûllEV)24.
And, in the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger, using almost the same
construction, points out the pragmatic function of myth as a diagnostic
stratagem, the technique of discovering deviation from truth :
19 Vide MOORS, op. cif., p. 1-24, «Interpretation ofPlato's Use of Myth". Note also
J.A. STEWART, The Myths of Plato (Ed. and newly introduced by G.R. LEVY),
Carbondale, 1960, p. 236, who relies on «transcendental feeling" to grasp the
meaning of a myth and denies that it can be interpreted apart from its literaI
expression.
20 This view runs counter to E,R. DODDS' position, op. cif., p. 376-377 and 385, at
least, as it bears on the Gorgias myth and argument-line.
21 P. SHOREY, What Plato Said, Chicago, 1934, p. 310, on Statesman, 268e-269a. Cf.
J. STENZEL, Plato's Method of Dialectic, D.J. Allen, trans., New York, 1964,
p.14-15.
22 R.G. LIDDELL and R. SCOTT, A Greek English Lexicon, (New ed. and rev. by R.S.
Jones and Roderick McKenzie), Oxford, 1951, l, 2021, indicate that 'l'eûooç here
is most like an adjective. SMITH, op. cit., p. 29-32, on 'l'eûooç with the sense of
'fiction'.
23 Cf. ZASLAVSKY, op. cif., p. 183, n. 53, who remarks that «one can falsif)r in such a
way as to adumbrate the truth which is being falsified".
24 Republic,382d1-3.
Thus, the end of the tale, so be it; but we shall make it useful (XP'ÎlcrtjlOV
oÈ aù'tov rcOtlWOIl€Sa) in recognizing how far we went wrong in our
exposition of the royal and political art in the previous discussion25.
But, perhaps, the most telling case occurs in the Timaeus, where, in the
preface to his cosmic account, Timaeus claims that myth is also useful
in providing belief so plausible, as to be an analogue to truth, that it is
fitting for one to accept it (the «likely story») as true :
The copy (belief) statements ('toùç À.6youç) Cafter the likeness of the
model [true statementsJ) will be probable and analogous to the true
statements : as being is to becoming, so truth to belief('toùç oÈ 'tOû rcpoç
IlÈV E1Œîvo àrcwcacrSfv'toÇ oÈ €iK:ovoç ÈtlCô'taç àvà À.6yov 'tE ElCEtVffiV
ov'taç' o'tt1t€P rcpoç YfV€crtV oùcrta, 'tou'to rcpoç rctcr'tLV àÀ'ÎlS€ta)
... let us be content [then] ... on the condition that it is fitting for us to
accept the likely story Crocr't€ rc€pt 'tOU'tffiV 'tov €llCÔta llûSov
àrcoo€XOllfVOUÇ rcPfrc€t 'tou'tou)26.
The salient point of this analogical inference27 is the alleged
progressive convergence of kindred values Calethic and pistic) in two
otherwise different cognitive conditions (epistemic and doxastic,
respectively) to a degree where belief becomes by conviction true opinion
and, finally, true opinion confirmed becomes knowledge.
Admittedly, these tactics seem strange and obscure, and it is rather
unlikely that one should accept fiction C",€ûooç) as fact CàÀ'ÎlS€ta) on the
basis of analogical inference, diagnostic stratagem, or mythotropic
conversion. But however odd or difficult it may be, this is the first
maneuver of Plato's mythological strategy, a mode of indirection which
leads to a more acceptable logical refinement in the adduction of
plausible propositions, from the fictive accounts, that will serve to
underpin the arguments at issue in the epagogic procedure of Socratic
midwifery.
Divining Fact from Fiction
An interpretive key. Thus having, in a sense, cracked the fabric of
the mantic myth by showing Plato's claim of its usefulness as an
indirect truth-bearing fiction, we turn, again, to the Timaeus for a clue
as to how fact may be divined from fiction, or, more precisely, how true
25 Statesman, 274el-4.
26 Timaeus, 29cl-3; c8-d3.
27 Vide ROBINSON, op. cit., p. 207-208.
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opinion (8oç,a ￠￀ＱｬＸｾ￧［Ｉ may be derived from unreflected belief(rctcrttç;).
After a distillation of his basic metaphysical assumptions forming the
background theory and logical limits of his cosmic myth, Timaeus
cautions his auditors on the indirection of the «likely story», especially,
on the imprecision of its language and consequent claim to truth, with
this caveat and prospect :
80crates, if we are unable to make statements (Myouç;) concerning so
many things about the gods and the genesis of the universe that are in
every way completely consistent (Oj.loÀoyoUj.LÉvouç;) and conclusive
(àrcllKptpffij.l€vouç;), do not be surprised; but if we adduce probabilities
second to none (j.lllOEVoÇ; ｾＧｴＧｴｯｶ rcapExffij.lE8a dKo'taç;), let us be content,
remembering that we ... are only human; and so it is fitting for us to
accept the likely story concerning these things (rcEpt 'tOU'tffiV 'tov
Eixo'ta j.lû80v àrcOOEX0j.l€VOuç;), but beyond this to inquire no further28 .
This cautionary word implies two probing inferences which earmark
the mantic function of myth and warrant an interpretive extrapolation
as its rationale : (1) that among the fictive details of the mythical
account, there are probable statements or implications whose positive
truth-value, while not confirmed, approaches certainty and (2) that these
plausible probabilities, being beyond reasonable doubt, are acceptable as
true opinion and, thus, worthy of belief.
A paradigm case. At the end of the last «act» of the argument-line in
the Gorgias, 80crates, having carried out, with Callicles (the immoralist
rhetorician), his inductive search on the moral question «whether doing
wrong is a greater evil than suffering it», proposes to tell an old story he
claims to be true to support his thesis that doing wrong is the greater evil.
l want to tell you a tale, if you will, how this is so [that it is a greater
evil to do wrong] (cüç; 'toû'to OÜ'tffiÇ; EXEt È8€Àffi Myov À€ç,at) ... Lend an
ear, then, as they say, to a very auspicious account (j.laÀa KaÀoû
Myou), which you may consider, as l suppose, a child's story (j.lû80v),
but l, an accurate account (Myov); for what l am about to tell you l
shall regard as really true (cüç; àÀ1l8fl yàp ov'ta)29.
In the beginning of the rule of Zeus, following the older sovereignty
of Cronos, the last judgment occurred on the day of one's death, when one
28 Timaeus, 29c4-d3. Note the correspondence between Timaeus' admonition and
Socrates' advice to Simmias at Phaedo, 107b4-9.
29 Gorgias, 522e5-523a3. Vide 1. DILMAN, Morality and the Inner Life ; A Study in
Plato's 'Gorgias', London, 1979, p. 173-186; W.H. THOMPSON, The 'Gorgias' of
Plato, New York, 1973, p. 165-166; DODDS, op. cit., p. 376-377.
was still in possession of body and aH its accouterments and could
muster friends as witness for the defense. The judges, however
(themselves also embodied and clothed), were confounded by these
external trappings, not being able to discern the real condition of the soul
from its appearance. Consequently, their judgments were flawed. The
guardians of Tartarus and the Blest Isles complained that they were
receiving the wrong souls. Zeus, then, charged Prometheus to keep secret
the day of death, so that no one would know when judgment would occur;
and he appointed his sons Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthys as judges
of the dead, who were now stripped of aH bodily paraphernalia. Naked
before the judges, and their character clearly revealed, aH souls would
receive their just dues. The soul that had committed remediable offenses
and thus judged curable would suffer bitter pain in torment, but would,
through this punishment, receive the benefit of purgation from iniquity
and restoration to life incarnate. The soul of a tyrant, king, or potentate,
however, being an evil and incurable soul, would be sent away to
everlasting punishment in the infernal dungeon of Tartarus, his
fearful sufferings serving as an example to aH wrongdoers. The soul of
the philosopher, having lived a holy life in company with justice and
truth, would be sent to the Isles of the Blest, there to dweH in eternal
happiness apart from aH evil30.
After framing the myth, however, Socrates breaks in to reaffirm his
commitment to its truth, but also draw from the fictive details basic
metaphysical assumptions that will underpin the ethical demands of his
foregoing argument-line.
This is, Callicles, what l, having heard, believe to be true (a a1C11Koffiç
1ttO"t€Ûül aÀ.llSil etVat); and from these tales, 1 logically infer
something such as this (Kat ÈK tOÛtülV trov MyülV to{OVO€ 'tt À-oy{Çollat
O"uIlPa{v€tv)31 [Socrates' explicit inferences] :
(1) That every person is a composite of soul and body, each having its
own nature and end;
(2) that the soul, as the measure of the person, is held accountable for
its pursuits through life, its activities determining its destiny;
and
(3) that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and the soul
passes into an afterlife to receive its just deserts :
30 Gorgias, 523a3-526d2. Here, the myth is compressed to its essentials; cf. G.K.
PLOCHMANN and F.E. ROBINSON, A Friendly Companion to Plato's 'Gorgias',
Carbondale, 1988, p. 232-241; SHOREY, op. cit., p. 152-153.
31 Gorgias, 524a8-b2.
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(a) the good soul, having pursued truth, justice, and piety,
receives its reward of a preternaturallife of happiness;
(b) the bad, but curable soul, having practiced falsehood,
injustice, and impiety, undergoes remedial punishment,
after which it returns to life incarnate with another chance to
become good by practicing virtue; but
(c) the incurable soul, having done extreme wrong, suffers
eternal punishment and thus becomes an example to
others32.
Although compressed, these inferred presuppositions are expressly
stated in Socrates' account; and these he believes to be true and, so,
worthy of belief.
Mter his extrapolation, Socrates adds more eschatological imagery
and then ends the tale with a reflection on its power to persuade,
admitting his conviction of its truth (D1tO 'tE 'tO'u'tCOV 'twv Mycov 1tÉ1tEtcrlllXt)
and professing to pursue the truth Ｈ Ｇ ｴ ｾ ｶ ･ ｘ ￂ Ｎ ｾ Ｘ ｅ ｴ ｡ ｶ eXcr1cWV 1tEtpacrollat) so to
become as good a person as possible. Then, chiding Callicles for his
callous disbelief, he offers reasons for his acceptance of the myth.
But then, perhaps, [CalliclesJ you think this is to be taken as an old
wife's tale (llû80ç... mcmEp ypa6ç) and you treat it with contempt; it
would be in no way surprising to treat it so if in our searching we
were to find elsewhere a better and truer account than this (at)'t(Îlv
PEÂ.'ttCO Kat eXÂ.Tj8Écr'tEpa). But now you see that you three, who are the
wisest of the Greeks, today, you and Polus, and Gorgias, have failed
to demonstrate (OUK ËXE'tE eX1toùdsat) that we ought to live any other
life than this33 .
Here, Socrates is ready to bank his trust on the truth of the tale on two
counts34 : (1) it is better and truer than any other accounts known, and
(2) it has not been disproved. The reasons are pragmatic and are
therefore similar to the practical account that he gives in the Republic
(382d, vide supra). And they compare readily with his apology for belief
32 Gorgias, 523a-526c : (l) 524b-d; (2) 524d-e; (3) 524b,d and 526b-c; (3a) 523a-b
and 526a-c; (3b) 523b, 524e-525c, 525e, and 526b; (3c) 525c-d and 526b.
33 Gorgias, 527a5-b2. Vide SMITH, op. cit., p. 32-34; DILMAN, op. cit., p.170-175 and
177-179.
34 SMITH, op. cit., p. 27, daims that Socrates' persuasion here is based not on its
fictive details but rather on the truths for which he has been arguing
throughout the dialogue - a view rather close ta mine.
in myth in the Phaedo, where after narrating an ancient tale35 , in
principle the same, Socrates explains to Simmias :
To contend stoutly that such things as these are so (oü'tooç ëxetv), just
as 1 have related them, is not fitting for anyone who has a mind at
aH; but that this or something like this is SO (oü'tooç ëXetv) concerning
our souls and their [future] dwellings, since the soul is manifestly
immortal, it seems to me that this is clearly seen to be a risk worth
taking for the one believing it (oiollévcp) - for the risk is noble - and
one ought to sing such things to oneself, as it were a magic charm36.
But an even more forceful statement concerning the positive truth-value
of myth appears in the Meno. There, we find the seminal ideas of the
emerging eschatological myth, as the purveyor of immediate truth,
serving as the occasion for the soul's recovery (&veXIlVll<JtÇ) of previously
acquired knowledge about virtue and other things. In response to the
captious argument over the puzzle of «how one can come to know what
one does not know», Socrates warrants an ancient tale he is about to
profile:
... l have heard from men and women wise in things divine ... [and
the tale they told] l, indeed, think true and noble (&À.118ft, ëllotye Ù01Œîv,
Kat KaMv) ... and what they say is this - but see whether you think
they are teHing what is true37.
After relating the tale, he declares is a sound rejoinder to the captious
argument and commits himself to its truth :
Therefore, we ought not to be persuaded by this sophistic reasoning
(OÜKOUV ùd nd8ea8at 'tot'l'tcp 't0 èptcr'ttK0 Mycp) ... [SO] believing it [the
tale] to be true, l want to join you in the search for virtue (cp EYro
mcr'teuoo &À.118eî dvat E8éÀ.ro Ile'tà crO\) Sl1'teîv &pe'tTt on Ecr'tiv)38.
The integrating factor in these cases, caHing up his trust, is the lack of
knowledge about a network of metaphysical assumptions, not open to
proof or disproof, but whose plausibility approaches the certainty of truth.
And the force of these assumptions as stand-ins for confirmed belief
elicits from Socrates an immediate reliance on their positive truth-value
as the best possible solution to this indeterminacy. As the adduction of
35 Vide Epistle VII, 335a2-5, re the truth ofancient tradition.
36 Phaedo, 114dl-7. Cf. Epistle VII, lac. cit. On persuasion and «magic charm»,
vide BURGER, op. cit., p. 9, 85,189, and 193.
37 Mena, 81a5-b3.
38 Mena, 81d5-e2.
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probabilities provides the rationale of the mantic myth, so this
adumbration of true belief serves as the psychological ground on which
his persuasion rests39.
Now briefly, in passing, l offer a slight disclaimer to E.R. Dodds'
explanation of Plato's alethic intention here. Dodds asks «In what sense
did Plato believe his myths to be 'true' ?» and replies that the clearest
answer is given at Phaedo 114d (with which l concur). But after a short
list of negative suggestions, he adds the clincher that Plato is not
«presenting philosophical truth in the guise of an allegory» : that this is
a Îl.6yoç40 expressing in imaginative terms a «truth of religion». l reply :
that while the fictive details serving in these cases are what we, today,
call religious or theological verisimilitudes, they are introduced here as
constructs not to be taken literally, but as symbols foreshadowing
metaphysical «truths» of philosophical import41 to reinforce practical
(ethical) demands and to support Legislative rule based on moral theory.
Nowhere in the Gorgias does Plato register Socrates' epagogic pursuit as
a quest for religious verities. Rather, it is an exercise to persuade one to
live the philosophie life in the practice of justice and the other virtue (-Cl]V
OtKatoaUVT\V Kat -Cl]V aÀÀT\V àpE-Cl]V àaKoûv-caç)42, viz., temperance
(aroCPPoQ"'l)VT\)43. These two moral perfections, representing the unity of the
virtues «<Mr. Outside" and «Mr. Inside»), produce in geometrical
proportion44 order in the soul and so fashion the best life45 - a token of
the orderly cosmos and the prospect of an orderly state46.
39 Cf. Phaedo, 107b4-9.
40 DoDDS, op. cit., p. 386.
41 To support religious implication here, DODDS, op. cit., p. 376-377, caBs on Epistle
VII, 335a2-5; sorne support along this line might he found at Mena, 81a-e.
FRIEDLÂNDER, op. cit., p. 42 and 189, l think, argues correctly in support of the
philosophical significance of ÀÔyoç in this context. On legislative rule re ethical
demands, vide Laws, 865d, 872d-e, and 972a-d. Cf. PLOCHMANN and
ROBINSON, op. cit., p. XXXN and p. 359, n. 22.
42 Gorgias, 527e1-5.
43 Cf. Gorgias, 504d1-3 and 506e1-507c4.
44 Gorgias, 507c8-508a7. Vide DODDS, op. cit., p. 337-340; THOMPSON, op. cit.,
p. VII-X; PLOCHMANN and ROBINSON, op. cit., p. 341-344; T. IRWIN, Plato :
'Gorgias', Oxford, 1979, p. 222-224.
45 STENZEL, op. cit., p. 31-35, re virtue and the good life; IRWIN, op. cit., p. 222, at
507h, notes that courage is also needed for a well-planned life (cf. Gorgias,
497d-498c).
46 Gorgias, 506d-508c. Vide A.W.H. ADKINS, Merit and Responsibility : A Study in
Greek Values, Oxford, 1965, p. 264 : these two virtues are among what ADKINS
caBs «the quiet virtues» (vide p. 2680.
Deriving First Principles
To this point, 1 have shown that myth in its pragmatic role projects its
mantic function as a truth-bearing fiction and that the extrapolation of
its «truths» from the fictive details makes explicit this function, viz., to
communicate metaphysical premises in support of practical (moral)
claims. 1 shall now argue that these «truths» emerge as «first
principles» to serve as the background theory and necessary condition
that define the logical limits of particular argument-lines (aU of ethical
import) in the 80cratic dialectic. Although evidence for this claim is
furnished in the myths and argument-lines of the Gorgias, the Meno, the
Phaedo, and the Republic47 , 1 confine my remarks to the evidence in the
Gorgias, using it is a single proof case.
An explanatory model. But, first, turning once more to the Timaeus
as our explanatory model, we find a paradigm account of this logical
closure. There, Timaeus performs a preliminary maneuver to establish
the ground rules for the narration of his likely cosmic story, drawing
these distinctions as his regulative principles :
(1) that what is Ctà av) is always real Ctà av àd) and has no
becoming (yéveow... OÙK Ëxov),
(la) but what becomes ('cà ytyvolu:vov) is always becoming (àd) and
is never real (ôv... OùOé1tO'CE); and
(2) that what is real is grasped by thought along with an account
(vOlîcrEt IlE'Cà À6'You),
(2a) but what is apparent is grasped by opinion along with sense-
perception without an account (06çn IlE'C' ￠ｴ｣ｲＸｾ｣ｲｅｲｯￇ àÀ6you), and
(3) [itJ has, of necessity, some cause ({m' àt'Ciou nvàç Èç yiyvea8m),
for nothing happens without a cause48 .
47 Cf. also the mantic function of myth in the Phaedrus and the Statesman, where
the argument-Hnes follow the method of diaeresis rather than the elenctic/
hypothetic method.
48 Timaeus, 27d5-28a6. At 47e-52d, Timaeus takes a new starting-point and posits
another basic assumption to account for physical and physiological processes
in the sphere of mechanical causation, Le., what cornes about of necessity
(UVUYK1,), the workings of the «errant cause» Ｈ Ｑ ｴ ￂ Ｎ ｡ ｶ ｲ ｯ ｾ ￩ ｶ ｬ Ｑ ai'da); vide A.E.
TAYLOR, A Commentary on Plato's 'Timaeus', Oxford, 1962, p. 297-351, and
F,M. CORNFORD, Plato's Cosmology, London, 1948, p. 160-197. l have omitted
this principle since it has no immediate relevancy to the ethical demands of the
Gorgias account - unless sorne point can be made for the «moral» space of
Tartarus, e.g., the ￂ Ｎ ･ ｻ ｾ ｲ ｯ ｶ of Gorgias, 524a2 (cf. Republic, 614a2 and Phaedrus,
248cl) and the purgatorium of Gorgias, 525b, Phaedo, 113a,d, and Republic,
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As A.E. Taylor points out, the distinction between being and becoming is
equated with the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible49;
and this equation entails corresponding equitable distinctions. What is
real implies the forms (do,,) as objects of knowledge and models
(1tupuody/.lu'tu) of things (1tpaY/.lu'tu)50; what is apparent implies things
as objects of opinion and copies (EtKOveç) offorms. And cause, understood
as the principle of agency, implies soul Ｈ ｜ ｪ ｦ ｕ ｘ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ the spontaneous initiator
of aU movement or change - (1) in respect of forms, the cause of mental
events, and (2) in respect of things, the cause of physical events - and
also the catalytic agent effecting the conjunction of forms and things51 .
These basic assumptions as «first principles», Timaeus c1aims,
constitute the conditions and limits of his «likely tale»52 : that whatever
is represented in the cosmic myth follows from these assumptions to
form a systematic (unified) account.
But more than this. We have here, in brief, 1 c1aim, Plato's basic
metaphysical background theory (his own «first principles»)53 that
frames and supports every argument-line in the dialogues. If the
«truths» of the mantic myth entail this theory, they then provide the kind
of logical c10sure Timaeus defines in his prefatory remarks and
demonstrates in his cosmic account. The mantic myth thus becomes, to
turn Socrates' metaphor54, the formal «head» of the material argument-
line to which it is attached; and its «truths», now «first principles»,
provide the foundation and logical restraints of its foregoing set of
«proofs».
615a; on these matters, vide DODDS, op. cit., p. 375-376, and THoMPsoN, op. cit.,
p.168.
49 TAYLOR, op. cif., p. 61.
50 l have used TCpaYIlŒ here as a generic term for 'thing' (cf. Gorgias, 507b6-7 and
Phaedo, 71a10; also É. DES PLACES, Platon œuvres complètes: Lexique, Paris,
1964, XIV (2),433.
51 Vide TAYLOR, op. cif., p. 63-65, re soul as cause.
52 Note these two phrases, apparently, used interchangeably : 'tov eiKO,Œ J.lû0ov
(Timaeus, 29d2) and KŒ,à Myov 'tov eiKO,Œ (Timaeus, 30b7). On the meanings
of Myoç and llû0oÇ, vide FRUTIGER, op. cif., p. 17-18, esp. n. 4; FRIEDLÂNDER, op.
cif., p. 172, 189, and 368, n. 2; BURGER, op. cit., Chp. 2; MOORS, op. cif., p. 100 sq.;
and SMITH, op. cif., p. 24-26.
53 Put in perspective, vide G.C. FIELD, The Philosophy ofPlato, London, 1961, p.
28-162.
54 Gorgias, 505c10-d3; cf. Laws, 752a2-4. In opposition to my argument, DODDS,
op. cif., p. 385 at 527a7, c1aims that «the preceding ethical arguments ... are
independent of the myth...».
A proof case. Reading the Gorgias myth more closely, we can
construe Socrates' moral postulates to conform to the pattern of the
regulative principles of the cosmic myth and thereby show that they
express the same metaphysical formula, only in meta-moral dress. The
categorial distinction between appearance and reality is implicit in the
contingent separation of body and sou! :
(1) that the soul is the subject of reality, active, eternal, and thus
imperishable;
(la) that the body is the vehicle of appearance, passive, temporal,
and thus perishable;
(2) that the virtues (forms) are the principles of reality, the objects
of knowledge and models of moral action;
(2a) that the vices (phantom-images) are the deceptions of
appearance, the objects of false opinion and devices of immoral
action; and
(3) that the soul (cause) is the agent of reality, the initiator of
human action and choice-maker of value judgments : (a) in
respect of virtues, the cause of moral action; (b) in respect of
vices, the cause of immoral action55 .
It now remains to show how this set of presuppositions as «first
principles» extends regulative control over its preceding argument-
line. An abridgement of the lengthy «three act» debate, focusing on two
moral issues central to the argument-line, provides sufficient proof of
the daim.
In the «first act», Socrates engages Gorgias the Sophist in discussion,
requesting the definition and power of rhetoric. And Gorgias responds,
without defining it, that it is the greatest good for man and an effective
teacher and guide. With elenctic acuity, Socrates counters decisively,
showing (1) that rhetoric stems from ignorance, not knowledge56, and
(2) that it is not a teacher of truth and justice, but simply a producer of
persuasion for belief57, heedless of truth or falsity, without an account of
right and wrong, and with more concern for appearance than reality 58.
In «act two», Polus the Sophist takes up the brand in Gorgias' behalf.
But, again, in similar fashion, Socrates checks the c1aim, adding that
rhetoric is not an art ('tÉXVll), but merely an empiric knack (È/L1tttpta Kat
55 Extrapolated from Gorgias, 523c2-526c5.
56 Gorgias, 455a-456a. N.B., the key citations in the footnotes 56-82 are from the
Gorgias and only the sections are given; other citations are given in full.
57 459c-461b.
58 458e-460a.
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ＧｴｰｴｰｾＩＬ a branch of flattery (KoÂ.m::da)59 (1) that deals in speculation and
pretense60, (2) that gives no account of the real nature of things and so
does not know their cause61, and (3) that aims at the pleasant and
ignores the best62. The upshot of this censure is that rhetoric is a base and
harmful profession, doing wrong by pandering to the lower tastes of the
crowd. And, here, 80crates makes his central moral point that doing
wrong is worse than suffering it ('tà àOtKeîV KIXKtoV... 'to\> àOtKeîcr8at}63.
Against Polus, who alleges the latter, 80crates argues, convincingly,
that doing wrong is more painful (Â.U1tllPOU:pov), baser (aïcrxtov), and more
ev il (KIXKtOv)64 than suffering it and makes the wrongdoer more
wretched (à8Â.tÛHEpaç)65. His reasoning, based on the following
grounds, is (1) that knowledge is virtue66; (2) that no one, while caring
for the good, will do evi167; (3) that one pursuing justice will never act
unjustly68; and (4) that the good and noble person is happy, but the unjust
and base person is wretched69. To this moral point, he adds a corollary :
that the wrongdoer, who pays the just penalty and is justly punished,
suffers what is good70. This he argues on the ground that one is benefited
from justice (1) by being relieved from the greatest evil and vice of the
soul (\jIuxftç 1tOVllPta)71; and (2) being thus relieved, one becomes better in
soul (PEÂ.'tteoV Ｇｴｾｶ ｜ｪｉｕｘｾｶＩ and is less wretched, receiving requital from
gods and men72. But to do wrong and not pay the penalty is the greatest of
aU evits and takes first place (1tav'tffiv llÉyt<HOV 'tE KaL 1tp6hov KaKrov)73.
In the «final act», Callicles the Rhetorician enters the debate, taking
issue with 80crates' position on wrongdoing. The argument turns on the
59 463a-d; 464e; 466a-468e.
60 464b-d.
61 465ab.
62 464d-465a.
63 468e-481b.
64 475b.
65 472e5-7.
66 466e-468b. Vide THoMPSON, op. cit., p. VIII-X; IRWIN, op. cit., p. 2-3.
67 467c-470b. Cf. 50ge; vide THOMPsoN, op. cit., p. 135-136; DILMAN, op. cit., Chp. 9;
IRWIN, op. cit., p. 140-148.
68 Vide 460a-c.
69 470e-473b.
70 476d-477a.
71 477a-e.
72 477a-478e; cf. 472e.
73 479d4-6.
question «how one ought to live» or «what course of life is best». Callicles
claims, on the ground of natural justice, that the stronger should have the
advantage over the weaker and should have free reign of the appetites.
Socrates counters with epagogic precision (1) that the descriptive
'stronger' and aU other such predicates are ambiguous and
referentially opaque74, (2) that the life of insatiate pleasure is not an
orderly life of temperance and self-control75 , (3) that the good, not
pleasure, is the end of aIl our actions76, and (4) that the good life, ordered
by temperance and justice, aims toward the best77. Turning again to his
central moral focus, Socrates argues here, as with Polus, that doing
wrong is the greater evil; suffering it, the less; and the greatest evil is to
do wrong and to pay no penalty78. But he makes the salient point that
since no one does wrong willingly79, one must have a certain power
(Oûval-Ltç) or art (tÉXVll) to save oneself from wrongdoing80. The tail of the
argument-line then tapers with Socrates and Callicles debating the
qualifications and functions of a true statesman81 . FinaIly, silencing
Callicles, at least for the moment, Socrates tells his doomsday tale and
then, with a plaintive protreptic, ends his abortive maieutic effort82.
The crucial requisite of a «saving arb, (referred to above) remains,
as Dodds notes, an unexplained prescription (remedy ?) in the Gorgias.
But it may weIl suggest what is implicit in the claim argued here : that to
live a good, orderly life, one must have a set of moral principles which
serve as a necessary condition for correct moral reasoning and to which
one commits oneself for proper moral action. This lack marks the
failure of Socrates' three disputants to argue successfully the
immoralist's case, for their radical skepticism precludes any such
74 488b-491e.
75 490d-499b.
76 497d-49ge.
77 500ed; 504a-508e.
78 508b-511a.
79 50ge-e.
80 510a3-5. N.B. DODDS, op. cit., p. 343; also ADKINS, op. cit., p. 273 and 280, n. 12,
points out that Plato introduees a philosophieal redefinition of téxVll as a skill
aiilling at an àyaOôv, a skill that ean give an aeeount of the real nature of things
(Gorgias, 465a).
81 513d-522e.
82 522e-527e. Vide DODDS, op. cit., p. 384, on 526d3-527e7.
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moral formula 83 . Without a basis, then, for moral reasoning, theyare
unable to comprehend the force of moral argument, and their sallies of
stratagems and rhetorical ploys are invariably ad hoc and myopic84 .
Moral argument, as other forms of discourse, is possible only within a
frame of reference which furnishes a systematic set of principles that
determines the logical limits and adequacy of the premises. This is
precisely Socrates' advantage. His background moral theory is the
«saving art» that enables him at every point in the epagogic procedure to
argue coherently and forcefully and to sustain his moral claims85.
Thus, Plato has introduced the mantic myth as a complement to
Socrates' art of midwifery. These two dramatic fabrications are
inseparable logical maneuvers86. Committed to the pursuit of truth and
its consequent knowledge, each undertakes the task in its own way. The
maieutic art, adopting the technique of indirect inference, sets its sails
toward the recovery of knowledge, while the mantic myth, employing the
strategy of indirect communication, steers its course toward the
discovery of truth. This mythic course, as Plato conceived it, is an
effectuaI passage from belief (ntanç) to true opinion (ùôça tXÀ118i]ç) and
provides the logical charter for the maieutic craft to make the difficult
passage from true opinion to knowledge (Enta'ti]lll1).
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83 Gorgias: 451e and 463d (cf. Socrates' remark at 465e); Polus : 461d and 477c;
Callicles : 468cl, 491b, d-e, 497a6, 497b3, 498dl, 5DDd, 511a, 511b, 513c, 515b-c,
and 518a-519d.
84 Cf. Gorgias, 467a-c. Vide DILMAN, op. cit., p. 9-24.
85 Vide IRWIN, op. cit., p. 3, 5-8,156,224,228, and 243, where he distinguishes in
various ways the Socrates of the Gorgias from the Socrates of the earlier
dialogues. The point that l have made (in general agreement with IRWIN) is
that Socrates here in the Gorgias, whether offering an epistemic disclaimer,
demontrates, nevertheless, a background theory ofregulative moral principles
- «saving art» - to which he is commited and which controls the argument-
line. The earlier Socrates professes ignorance, disclaiming knowledge of the
moral virtues, and relies solely on the argument (elenchus) to out with the
requisite moral truth and knowledge.
86 DODDS, op. cit., p. 385 at 527a7, claims that the myth and the preceding
argument-line are indepedent of each other.
